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Abstract:  The evolution of many economic variables is affected by expectations that 
economic agents have with respect to the future development of these variables. We show, by 
means of laboratory experiments, that market behaviour depends to a large extent on whether 
realized market prices respond positively or negatively to average price expectations. In the 
case of negative expectations feedback, as in commodity markets, prices converge quickly to 
their equilibrium value, confirming the rational expectations hypothesis. In the case of 
positive expectations feedback, as is typical for speculative asset markets, large fluctuations in 
realized prices and persistent deviations from the benchmark fundamental price are likely. We 
estimate individual forecasting rules and investigate how these explain the differences in 
aggregate market outcomes.  
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A key difference between natural and social sciences is that in social systems individual 
expectations or beliefs can affect the aggregate outcome. An investor buys a stock that h e 
expects to go up in the future, a chip-manufacturer builds a new production facility because 
she expects that demand and therefore prices will be high after goods have been produced. 
Expectations determine individual behaviour of economic agents and the  actual market 
outcome, i.e., prices and traded quantities, are determined as an aggregation of individual 
behaviour. Simultaneously, economic agents form their expectations on the basis of market 
history. Therefore, a market, like other social environments, may be viewed as an expectations 
feedback system: past market behaviour determines individual expectations which, in turn, 
determine current market behaviour and so on. We distinguish two important types of 
feedback, positive and negative. We say that a  market has positive (negative) expectations 
feedback, when a higher average price forecast yields a higher (lower) realized market price. 
This paper may be viewed as an experimental testing of how expectations feedback affects 
aggregate market outcome and individual forecasting behaviour.  
  In most markets both types of feedback may play a role. Positive feedback however, 
seems to be particularly relevant for speculative asset markets. If many agents expect the price 
of an asset to rise and therefore start buying the asset, aggregate demand will increase, and so, 
by the law of supply and demand, will the asset price. High price expectations thus become 
self-confirming and lead to high realized asset prices. Similarly, when a majority of investors 
expects markets to go down, this belief will be self-fulfilling and the market will go down. In 
markets where the role of speculative demand is less important, e.g. in markets for non-
storable commodities, negative feedback may play a more prominent role. Consider e.g. a 
supply-driven commodity market. If many producers expect future prices to be high they will 
increase production which, according to the law of supply and demand, will lead to a low  
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realized market price. In contrast, if firms expect a low price, they will produce little and, as a 
consequence, the realized market price will be high.  
To investigate how the expectations feedback structure affects aggregate market 
outcomes and individual forecasting behaviour we designed experimental market environ-
ments  that only differ in the sign of the expectations feedback, but are equivalent along all 
other dimensions. We compare these markets with respect to the coordination of individual 
expectations and (speed of) convergence to the fundamental market equilibrium price.   
 
1.   Related Work 
It is useful at this point, to discuss some closely related literature. The distinction between 
positive and negative expectation feedback is related to the concept of, respectively, strategic 
complements and strategic substitutes, as introduced by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985). 
When actions are strategic complements, agents have an incentive to imitate other agents. 
This is the case in an asset market, where predicting a price close to the predictions of the 
other participants turns out to be most profitable. Coordination of predictions enhances the 
impact of the irrational participants upon the realized prices and convergence to the rational 
equilibrium price becomes unlikely. When actions are strategic substitutes, agents have an 
incentive to deviate from what other agents are doing. This is the case in negative feedback 
markets, where agents have an incentive to predict high (low) prices when the majority 
predicts prices below (above) the equilibrium price.  The impact of irrational individuals will 
be limited and convergence to the equilibrium price is more likely. Coordination of 
predictions will only take place after convergence.  
Fehr and Tyran (2002, 2005) report on a related experiment in which they study the 
adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money shock in a price setting game with 
positively (complements) or negatively sloped (substitutes) reaction curves. They find much  
 
4 
faster convergence in the substitute condition, in line with our results.
1 They argue that 
differences in the ``stickiness of price expectations’’ are key for understanding these results. 
Our experiments shed more light on this important issue, since they provide detailed 
information about the relation between individual expectations and aggreg ate outcomes in 
markets with strategic complements (positive feedback) and strategic substitutes (negative 
feedback).  
Since the seminal work of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972), rational expectations 
became the dominating expectations hypothesis in the seventies and eighties. More recently 
models of bounded rationality and adaptive learning have become popular in macro-
economics, as discussed e.g. in Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (1998,2001), and 
in finance in Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Hommes (2006). The state of the art on adaptive 
learning has recently been nicely formulated in an overview by Bullard (2006, p.205):  ``The 
state of affairs is thus that some rational expectations equilibria are learnable while others 
are not. Furthermore, convergence will in general depend on all the economic parameters of 
a given system, […] (that is, it depends on the entire economic structure)’’.  
 Laboratory experiments on expectations and forecasting have e.g. been performed by 
Schmalensee (1976), Hey et al. (1994), Dwyer et al. (1993) and Kelley and Friedman (2002). 
In particular, several experiments in environments with  expectations feedback  between 
individual forecasts and aggregate market outcomes have been performed in Marimon and 
Sunder (1993), Marimon et al. (1993), Peterson (1993), Gerber et al. (2002), Hommes et al. 
(2005, 2007), Sutan and Willinger (2005) and Adam (2007). The current paper is motivated 
                                                   
1 Another related study concerning strategic substitutes versus strategic complements is Potters and Suetens 
(2005). Their focus, however, is more on social behaviour than on convergence and coordination. Cournot games 
and Betrand games are both social dilemma situations (the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient), but in Cournot 
games actions are strategic substitutes while in Bertrand games they are strategic complements. Potters and 
Suetens design two games with the same Nash equilibrium, the same social optimum and the same absolute (but 
opposite) slope of the reaction curve. They find more cooperation in the case of strategic complements than when 




by striking differences in earlier experiments on expectation formation in an asset pricing 
framework in Hommes et al. (2005) and a cobweb framework in Hommes et al. (2007). In the 
asset pricing framework coordination on trend following strategies caused oscillatory price 
movements with persistent deviations from fundamentals, whereas in the cobweb framework 
prices were relatively stable, often moving close towards the equilibrium level. We conjecture 
that these striking differences can be attributed to the sign of the expectations feedback 
structure. Unfortunately however, the experimental designs are also different in a number of 
other ways. For example, the temporary equilibrium asset pricing framework required two -
period ahead forecasts, whereas in the cobweb framework subjects had to make one-period 
ahead forecasts. Another important difference is the presence of fundamental ``robot traders’’ 
in the asset pricing framework of Hommes et al. (2005). The main goal of the current paper is 
to investigate whether a different expectations feedback structure (positive versus negative) 
alone, leads to differences in individual forecasting and aggregate market behaviour.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the positive and negative 
feedback systems and set out the experimental design. Section 3 describes aggregate market 
behaviour, Section  4 investigates individual forecasting strategies, and Section 5 concludes. 
The appendices finally contain a more detailed description of the models underlying the 
positive and negative expectations feedback systems, a description of the experimental 
instructions and detailed estimation results of the individual prediction strategies.  
 
2.   Expectations Feedback and Experimental Design  
In both treatments of the experiments the price adjustment rule will be of the simple form    
()
e
tt pfp = ,                  (1) 
where 
e
t p is the  average price forecast of all subjects in the market. Appendix A describes 
how this simple pricing rule can be derived from ``the law of supply and demand’’ for a  
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cobweb model (negative feedback) and an asset pricing model (positive feedback). In fact, 
since we assume demand and supply to be linear, in the experiments the map  f in (1) will be 
linear, with negative respectively positive slope. As discussed above, positive versus negative 
feedback is related to the concepts of strategic complements versus strategic substitutes. We 
use positive/ negative feedback to stress the fact that the difference is entirely due to the sign 
of the derivative of the expectations feedback map in (1).  
For the negative feedback treatment the price adjustment rule is given by  





tt t pp e =-+           (2)
                   






tt t ppe =++            (3)  











t p p  is the av erage prediction of the six participants in the 
experimental market, and  t e ~ ( ) 4 / 1 , 0 N  is a random term, representing e.g. small random 
fluctuations in the supply of the risky asset. The two treatments are perfect symmetric 
opposites. One can easily check that the rational expectations equilibrium price of both (2) 
and (3) is 60
* = p , and that if all participants would forecast 60 , =
e
t h p , then realized market 
price becomes t t p e + = 60 . Both price series (2) and (3) are generated as a linear function of 
the average predictions of six participants, the realization of the random shocks is exactly the 
same and the absolute value of the slope of the relation between  t p  and 
e
t p  is equal to  21 / 20  
for both treatments
2. The only difference between the treatments is the sign of this slope. Note 
also that  60
* = p  is a stable steady state under naïve expectations, 1 , - = t
e
t h p p , since the 
absolute value of the slope of (2) and (3) is given by 20/21 and is smaller than one. 
                                                   
2 In a dynamic asset pricing model this slope is typically 1/(1+r), where r is the risk free interest rate. This slope 





Thirteen experimental markets of 50 periods were created, six with negative and seven with 
positive feedback. In each market six students participated, who earned more money if they 
predicted market prices more successfully. The computerized experiments were conducted in 
the CREED laboratory. Figure 1 shows the main experimental computer screen. Subjects have 
information about past realized market prices and past own predictions, but have no 
information about other individual predictions. Subjects were not explicitly informed about 
the price generating mechanisms ((2) or (3)), but did obtain qualitative information about the 
market, in particular that the market price was determined by the ``law of demand and 
supply’’, that is, the market price will increase (decrease) when there is excess demand 
(supply). This is in line with the real markets where participants know the direction  of price 
changes caused by market expectations, but not the magnitude of these changes. Appendix B 
contains a detailed description of the experimental instructions.  
The computer screen in Figure 1 shows the actual development of one of the 
experimental markets, in this case an asset pricing market, from the perspective of one of the 
participants. The participant observes both a graphical and a numerical representation of the 
realized market prices and his previous price predictions, in the upper left and right panel 
respectively. In the middle left panel information is displayed regarding the total earnings so 
far of the participant, his earnings in the last period and the present time period of the 
experiment. The participant submits his price prediction f or the next period in the lower 
middle panel. The individual earnings E per period are based on the quadratic error of the 
prediction:  







tht EMaxpp =--,          (4)  
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and 1300 points corresponds to 0.5 Euro. Earnings were on average about 22 Euro in 
approximately 90 minutes.  
 
3.   Aggregate Market Behaviour  
Results of the experiments are shown in Figure 2 (6 markets with negative feedback) and 
Figure 3 (7 markets with positive feedback). Each individual panel shows, for one 
experimental market, the realized prices and the six time series of individual predictions. Two 
characteristics of the data catch the eye immediately. First, in the negative feedback market 
prices tend to go through an initial phase of high volatility, neatly converging afterwards to 
the equilibrium price 60, only to be disturbed occasionally by the impact of a mistake by one 
of the group members. Allowing for a short initial learning phase, for all six negative 
feedback markets average prices are statistically not significantly different at a 5% level from 
what the rational expectations hypothesis (i.e. when all agents are rational) predicts. Volatility 
is not significantly different at a 5% level from the volatility under rational expectations for 
the first (N1) and fourth (N4) market.  
In contrast, the results for the positive feedback markets are strikingly different. 
Although the heterogeneity of predictions decreases in a much shorter period, a quick 
convergence to the equilibrium price does not occur. Rather, most groups show a  slow 
oscillatory movement around the equilibrium price of 60, and come close to it only in the very 
long run. Average prices and volatility in all positive feedback groups are significantly 
different at a 5% level from the price and volatility under rational expectations. Second, in 
both treatments there is little dispersion between individual predictions within experimental 
markets, which is particularly remarkable for the non-converging positive feedback treatment. 
Participants in the positive feedback t reatment  quickly coordinate on a common non-
equilibrium prediction rule.   
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Convergence of prices and coordination of expectations is demonstrated in more detail 
in Figure 4. The upper panel shows the median over 6 or 7 markets of the absolute difference 
bet ween the market price and the equilibrium price of 60 for both treatments. We find a much 
higher degree of convergence to the equilibrium price in the negative feedback treatment, 
already after period two (statistically significant at 5% in 44 of the 48 periods, Wilcoxon test). 
Coordination of expectations is measured by the standard deviation of the individual 
expectations of the market participants. The lower panel shows the median over 6 or 7 
markets of these standard deviations for each period. A low standard deviation implies a high 
level of consensus among the participants about the future price. We find that the standard 
deviation is higher (and therefore coordination is less) for the negative feedback treatment in 
the early periods 2 -7 (statistically significant at 5%, Wilcoxon test). After period 7, 
coordination is very high in both treatments. Note that, outside of equilibrium, it pays off for 
participants in the negative feedback treatment to ‘disagree’ with the majority: if the average 
prediction is high, the realized price will be low. This drives the heterogeneity in predictions 
in the early periods and the fast convergence to the equilibrium price. In the positive feedback 
treatment, on the other hand, ‘agreeing’ with the majority pays off since the market price will 
be close to the average price prediction.  This quick coordination of price predictions in the 
positive feedback treatment is surprising, since participants were not able to observe each 
others predictions during the experiment, making the coordination itself "blind". Individual 
price predictions and aggregate market prices can concisely be summarized as exhibiting 
"slow coordination and fast convergence" in the negative feedback treatment, and "fast 





4.   Expectations Rules 
Before investigating individual forecasting strategies in the experiment, we consider two 
benchmarks of expectations, naïve and average price expectations.  
 
Two simple benchmark rules 
Naïve expectations means that all subjects use the last observation as their forecast, i.e.  
1 - = t
e
ht p p ,            (5) 
and average price expectations refers to the case when all subjects take the average price as 














p .           (6) 
Figure 5 shows the realized market prices under naïve and average price expectations for both 
treatments. This figure suggests that naïve and average price expectations are not consistent 
with  the laboratory experiments in Figures 2 and 3. For the cobweb treatment with naïve 
expectations (top left panel) convergence to the equilibrium price is much slower than in the 
experiments, and the persistent up and down price oscillations are much more regular than 
what has been observed in the experiments. Moreover, in contrast to the experiments the naïve 
forecast is systematically wrong as it is high (low) when realized prices turn out to be low 
(high). Average price expectations in the cobweb treatment (top right panel) leads to an 
extremely quick convergence to the equilibrium price, in fact already after two periods, which 
is faster than in the experiment. For the asset pricing treatment with naïve expectations 
(bottom left panel) slow monotonic convergence to the equilibrium price occurs. The key 
difference with the experiments is the absence of (slow) oscillatory movements under naïve 
expectations. The asset pricing treatment with average expectations (bottom right panel) 
shows an extremely slow move ment in the direction of the fundamental equilibrium, and, in  
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contrast to the experiments, the market price stays far below 60 for all 50 time periods. From 
these simple simulations we conclude that naïve and average expectations lead to quite 
different results for both treatments. None of these benchmark forecasting rules gives a good 
description of individual forecasting in the experiments.  
 
Individual Prediction Strategies 
Linear prediction rules, with 3 lags in prices and expected prices, of the form 
￿ ￿
= =










i t h i i t i
e
t h p s p o c p n             (7) 
have been estimated for each individual participant. Surprisingly, predictions of 71 out of 78 
participants could be described successfully (i.e. without autocorrelation in the residuals) this 
way (see Appendix C, Tables 1  and 23). Moreover, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the 
estimated linear forecasting rules is small for both treatments, with mean 1.15 for the cobweb 
treatment and mean 0.66 for the asset pricing treatment, which would correspond to high 
earnings of 1282 p oints for the cobweb treatment and 1269 points for the asset pricing 
treatment, both close to the maximum of 1300 points (=0.5 Euro) per time period. These 
results suggest that participants use simple linear forecasting rules based on recent 
information to form predictions. The time series of individual forecasts already suggested that 
individual forecasts are close to the equilibrium price level for the cobweb treatment (see 
Figure 2) and fluctuate slowly around the equilibrium level for the asset pricing treatment (see 
                                                   
3 In the estimations we have excluded a short initial learning phase. The learning phase ends when the majority 
of individual forecasts (i.e. at least 4 subjects in each group) is within 5% of the realized market price. In the 
asset pricing treatment the initial learning phase lasts only 3 periods, whereas in the cobweb treatment it lasts 7 
periods. We have also excluded a few exceptional time periods from the estimations, with outliers in individual 
forecasts. These excluded periods are as follows. For the six Cobweb groups: {44}, {8,…,12}, {36,45,..., 50}, 
Ø, {21, 41} and { 8, ..., 15,22} respectively. For the seven Asset Pricing groups:  Ø, Ø, Ø, {39}, {7, ..., 16, 
28, 34,45}, {15, 25, 35} and Ø respectively. The time series of individual forecasts in Figures 1 and 2 show that 





Figure 3). For the estimated individual linear forecasting rules (7) this can be checked, by 












.                (8) 
Figure 6 shows f requency distributions of the long run equilibrium price level 
* p in (8), 
corresponding to the estimated individual forecasting rules for the cobweb treatment (top 
panel) and the asset pricing treatment (bottom panel). For the cobweb treatment 34 forecasting 
rules from Table 1 (excluding the 2 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and 
more than 60% of these have an equilibrium level 
* p very close (within distance 0.5) to the 
fundamental equilibrium price 60. The mean equilibrium level is 56.90, with standard 
deviation 9.79; the null hypothesis that the equilibrium level 
* 60 p = can not be rejected (p-
value 0.078). For the asset pricing treatment 37 forecasting rules from Table 2 (excluding the 
5 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and most rules have an equilibrium 
level fairly close to the fundamental equilibrium price 60. The mean equilibrium level is 
64.97, with a much higher standard deviation of 30.34. Also for the asset pricing treatment; 
the null hypothesis that the equilibrium level is 
* 60 p = can not be rejected (p-value 0.332).  
  Apparently, in both treatments individuals are able to learn the fundamental, long run 
equilibrium level
* 60 p = , for example by observing that the average price is close to 60. This 
motivates an even simpler linear individual forecasting rule  




t h p p p p p n b a a a a + - + - - + + = - - - -         (9) 
This rule has a simple behavioural  explanation, as the forecast is simply a weighted average 
of the last observed price 1 t p - , the last individual forecast  ,1
e
ht p -  and the long run equilibrium 
level 60, together with a trend term ( ) 2 1 - - - t t p p b , measuring how participants respond to the  
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last price change. Since the rule (9) is based upon one lag in price, forecast and price change, 
we refer to it as the “first order heuristic”. Surprisingly, for 40 of the 78 participants the first 
order heuristic can be successfully estimated, and the estimated parameters are given in Table 
3 in Appendix C and represented graphically in Figure 7.  
  Concerning individual prediction strategies, there are two important differences 
between the positive and negative feedback treatments. In the case of positive feedback (21 
prediction rules, black dots in Figure 7), the trend parameter ß is typically highly significant 
(15 rules) and strongly positive (>0.5, for 11 rules). In the negative feedback case, only 3 rules 
have a significant ß, one slightly positive (0.06) and two  negative values (-0.44 and -0.38, thus 
acting as contrarians). Trend following strategies are thus more important in the case of 
positive feedback, while some individuals behave as contrarians in the negative feedback 
case. The second difference between the treatments is that, in the case of positive feedback, 
the sum  12 aa +  is typically close to 1 (>0.9 for 19 rules), implying that the equilibrium level 
* 60 p = gets little weight in individual forecasting. In contrast, for the negative feedback 
treatment, only for 3 rules  12 0.9 aa +>, and typically it is much smaller, implying that the 
equilibrium price level 60 gets high weight in individual forecasting
4.  
  Summarizing one can say that, in the positive feedback environment participants tend 
to base their prediction on a weighted average of the last price and the last prediction, and 
extrapolate trends in past prices from there ( 0 , 2 1 > a a ,  2 1 a a +  close to 1 and  0 > b ), without 
taking the equilibrium price into account. Individual forecasting in the positive feedback 
treatment may thus be described as naïve and adaptive trend following. On the other hand, 
most of the estimated prediction rules from the negative feedback treatment (19 prediction 
                                                   
4 From Table 3 it can be seen that for 8 individual rules in the negative feedback treatment, all estimated 
coefficients  1 a ,  2 a  and ß are 0, so that the individual forecasts in (9) reduce to a constant forecast 60. 
Comparing these results to Table 1, it can be seen that for 7 of these individuals the corresponding estimated 
linear rules in (10) reduce to a constant close to 60.    
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rules, yellow dots in Figure 7) lie along the positive  1 a -axis ( 2 a  and  b  close to 0), implying 
that typically predictions in that treatment are a weighted average between the last observed 
price and the equilibrium price level. Individual forecasting in the negative feedback treatment 
may thus be described as adaptive-average price expectations.  
 
5.   Discussion 
 
Neo-classical economic theory assumes that individuals form expectations rationally (Muth 
(1961), Lucas (1972)). This implies that on average market participants make correct price 
forecasts, and that prices quickly converge to their market clearing equilibrium values, 
thereby leading to an efficient  allocation of resources (Fama (1970, 1991)). However, large 
fluctuations of prices on financial markets have fueled the debate whether this is indeed a 
good description of economic behaviour (Shiller (1981), DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and 
Garber (1990)). Our findings show that whether rational expectations (i.e. when  all agents 
have rational expectations) gives a good description of aggregate market behaviour depends 
upon the underlying expectations feedback structure. In fact, commonly observed differences 
between experimental commodity and financial markets (Smith (1962), Smith et al. (1988), 
Gode and Sunder (1993), Noussair et al. (2002) and Hommes et al. (2005)) may be attributed 
to a large extent to this feedback structure. Prices in commodity markets where speculative 
demand only plays a limited role will be much more stable and closer to the equilibrium value 
when the product (and production technology) has been around for a while, and commodity 
prices can fluctuate wildly only for relatively new products (e.g. computer chips, see The 
Economist, 1996a,b, 2001). The fact that some established commodity markets regularly 
exhibit fluctuations is consistent with our conclusions, since these fluctuations may be 
attributed to the presence of demand-driven speculators (Cashin et al. (2002), and Canoles et 
al. (1998)). In contrast, due to the positive feedback structure driven by speculative demand,  
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financial markets can easily diverge from the equilibrium price and be relatively unstable and 
excessively volatile.  
  What causes these differences in aggregate outcome? Two important differences 
between the treatments have been observed: (i) in the positive feedback treatment market 
prices are characterized by  slow oscillatory movements, while in the negative feedback 
treatment market prices converge to the steady state
* 60 p = , within about 10 periods, and (ii) 
in the positive feedback treatment coordination of individual forecasting rules is extremely 
quick, in fact within 3 periods, while in the  negative feedback treatment heterogeneity in 
forecasts persist for about 10 periods, and coordination only occurs after the market price has 
converged to its steady state. Our estimation results of individual forecasting rules clearly 
provides an explanation for the oscillatory price movements in the positive feedback 
treatment. In a market with positive feedback,  trend following behaviour is much more 
prominent than in a market with negative feedback. In markets dominated by positive 
feedback, when a majority of individuals uses a trend following strategy, other individuals 
have an incentive to use such a strategy too, thus reinforcing trends in prices. In contrast, in 
markets dominated by negative feedback when many individuals adopt trend following 
strategies, it becomes more profitable for other agents to go against the trend. As a 
consequence, trend following strategies do  not survive in a market dominated by negative 
feedback, but play an important role in markets dominated by positive feedback, such as 
speculative asset markets. In particular, the survival of trend following strategies contributes 
to oscillatory price movements, persistent deviations from the fundamental benchmark and 
excess volatility.  
Explaining the differences observed in the first ten periods of the experiments is more 
difficult, but the realized market prices in Figures 2 and 3 suggest the following tentative 
explanation. In the first period of an experiment, subjects make heterogeneous forecasts,  
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leading to some average forecast,  say around 50. In the positive feedback treatment, the 
realized market price will then be fairly close to, but slightly above the average forecast, i.e. 
slightly above 50. In the second period, if most subjects put large weight to the observed 
market price (i.e. their forecasts are close to naïve expectations), this simple but plausible 
forecasting behaviour will lead to relatively small forecasting errors and coordination of 
forecasts, say close to 50, and a second realized market price close to, but slightly above the 
first observation. After this quick coordination of forecasts, realized market prices move 
slowly and, as our estimation of individual forecasting rules has shown, trend following 
behavior may reinforce slow oscillatory price movements. The i nitial stage of an experiment 
in the negative feedback treatment is quite different. Assuming heterogeneous forecasts in the 
first period with an average forecast of say 50, due to the negative feedback, market price will 
be pushed to the other side of the steady state price 60, leading to a realized market price close 
to 70. In the second period, when most subjects put large weight to the observed market price 
(i.e. their forecasts are close to naïve expectations), once more due to the negative feedback 
the next realized market price will be on the other side, that is, below the steady state price 60, 
with a value of say somewhat above 50. Quick coordination of individual forecasts therefore 
is unlikely in the case of negative feedback and subjects make large forecasting errors. Due to 
the negative feedback, prices fluctuate considerably in the initial phase of the experiments 
and, as shown in Figure 2, individual forecasts remain  heterogeneous for a while. Naïve 
expectations and trend following rules perform bad in these circumstances, and it is more 
likely that subjects adopt some average or adaptive expectations rule. Fig. 2 shows that indivi-
dual forecasts become less extreme and move in the direction of the average price, thus stabi-
lizing price fluctuations and enforcing convergence to the steady state after about 10 periods.  
Our results are in line with different, but related experiments in Fehr and Tyran (2002, 
2005) in markets with strategic complements (positive feedback) and strategic substitutes  
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(negative feedback). See also Camerer and Fehr (2006) for an extensive recent discussion. 
Our results are also consistent with noise trader models (DeLong et al. (1990ab)) and herding 
models in finance (Kirman (1993), Lux (1995), Brock and Hommes (1998)), showing that 
simple trend following strategies may explain investor’s behaviour in financial markets. 
Estimation of individual forecasting rules suggests an explanation for the differences between 
the treatments. We conjecture that models with  heterogeneous expectations rules and 
evolutionary and reinforcement learning, e.g. as in Brock and Hommes (1997) and Branch 
(2004), may explain these different outcomes in markets with positive and negative feedback. 
Only in an environment where positive feedback is sufficiently strong, trend following 
strategies have a chance of surviving evolutionary competition. We leave this conjecture for 
future work.  
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Figure 1: The main experimental computer screen for one of the markets in the asset pricing 
treatment, as seen by one of the subjects. Subjects have information, both graphically and in a 
table, about previous realized market prices and previous own predictions. The Dutch labels 
of the computer screen translate as follows: “prijs” = price; “voorspelling” = prediction; 
“werkelijke prijs” = market price; “ronde” = round; “totale verdiensten” = total earnings; 
“verdiensten deze periode” = earnings this period; “Wat is uw voorspelling voor de volgende 
periode?” = What is your prediction for the next period?; “Een nieuwe ronde is begonnen” = 







Figure 2: Prices and predictions in the negative feedback treatment. Each panel contains, for 
one experimental market, time series for the realized price (in red) and the time series of 










Figure 3: Prices and predictions in the positive feedback treatment. Each panel contains, for 
one experimental market, time series for the realized price (in red) and the time series of 




Figure 4: Upper panel gives the median, over the different groups, of the absolute difference 
between the market price and the equilibrium price; the lower panel gives the median, over 
the different groups, of the standard deviations of individual predictions. Solid lines 
correspond to the negative feedback treatment, broken lines correspond to the positive 





(a) cobweb, naive expectations      (b) cobweb, average expectations 
 
           
 
(c) asset pricing, naive expectations       (d) asset pricing, average expectations 
 
           
 
 
Figure 5: Realized market prices (blue) and predictions (red) for both treatments in the 
benchmark cases when all agents have naïve expectations (left panel s) and average price 








Figure 6: Frequency distribution of long run equilibrium price level 
* p in (8), corresponding 
to estimated individual forecasting rules for cobweb treatment (top panel) and asset pricing 
treatment (bottom level). For the cobweb treatment 34 forecasting rules of Table 1 (excluding 
2 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and more than 60% has an equilibrium 
level very close to the true equilibrium price 60. For the asset pricing treatment 37 forecasting 
rules of Table 2 (excluding 5 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and most 






Figure 7: Prism of First-Order Heuristics containing the parameter vectors of the prediction 




t h p p p p p n b a a a a + - + - - + + = - - - - 2 1 2 1 1 , 2 1 1 , 60 1 . The smaller 
graph on the right is a top-down view of the prism. Yellow dots depict prediction rules from 
participants in the negative feedback treatment and black dots depict rules from participants in 
the positive feedback treatment. Positive (negative) values of  b  correspond to a trend 
following (trend reversing) prediction rule. The special cases “naivety”, “fundamentalism” 
and “obstinacy” correspond to 1 , - = t
e
t h p p ,  60 , =
e




t h p p 1 , , - = , respectively. Finally, 










Appendix A: Expectations Feedback Models 
This appendix describes the cobweb and asset pricing model underlying the negative and 
positive feedback systems. In both treatments, the price adjustment rule is of the general form 
￿
=




t h t t t p p ED p p
1
, 1 1 ) , ( l ,                   (A1) 
where the excess d emand function  ED depends upon the market price  1 t p -  and individual 
forecasts 
e
t h p ,  and ? is the speed of adjustment. In real markets, the price adjustment rule (1) 
depends upon lagged market price 1 t p -  and individual forecasts
e
t h p , . In the experiments 
however, parameters have been fixed in such a way that the dependence of  t p  on  1 - t p  cancels 
out, in order to  keep the setting as simple as possible and to  isolate the effect of the 
expectations feedback. In the experiments therefore, (A1) is of the simpler form   
()
e
tt pfp = ,                                       (A2) 
where 
e
t p is the average price forecast of all subjects in the market. Since we assume demand 
and supply to be linear, in the experiments the map  f in (A2) is linear, with positive 
respectively negative slope.  
 
Negative feedback: the cobweb framework.  
The market with negative expectations feedback used in the experiment is based on the 
classical cobweb or hog cycle model. The cobweb model has served as a benchmark 
framework to study various expectations schemes, e.g. naïve expectations (Ezekiel (1938)), 
adaptive expectations (Nerlove (1958)), rational expectations (Muth (1961)), OLS learning 
(Bray and Savin (1986)), genetic algorithm learning (Arifovic (1994)) and heterogeneous 
expectations (Brock and Hommes (1997)). Originally the model was mainly applied to  
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agricultural commodities such a corn or hogs, but later on it has e.g. also been used as a model 
for the demand for lawyers, engineers (Freeman (1975), (1976)) and public school teachers 
(Zarkin (1985)) and the demand for oil (Krugman (2001)). The key feature of the model is a 
fixed production lag, so production decisions by price-taking firms are based on a forecast of 
the market price in the next time period. Let  ( ) t p D  be a nonnegative and monotonically 
decreasing demand function and let  ( )
e
t h p S ,  be the nonnegative supply function of firm  h, 
derived from expected profit maximization. Supply of firm h in the next period depends upon 
the expected price,
e
t h p , , for that period by that firm. The second order condition for profit 
maximization implies that  S  is a non-decreasing function. Moreover, we assume that all firms 
have the same supply function. In the model equality between demand and supply in each 
period is not required, but in each period the market price is adjusted in the direction of the 
excess demand, the trade gap itself being absorbed by a hypothetical market maker. An 
increase of the price forecast leads to increasing production, a decreasing excess demand and 
therefore a lower market price. The following price-adjustment formula was used:  













- + = ￿
=
- -                  (A3) 
The expression between brackets represents excess demand, where the market maker uses 
demand in period t-1 as a proxy for demand in period t. We assume there are H suppliers, only 
differing in the way they form expectations. In the laboratory experiment we take H=6. The 
market maker adjusts the market price proportionally to the excess demand, with a positive 
price adjustment coefficient ?. The term  t e  is a random term, representing e.g. small 
uncertainties in demand; in the laboratory experiment  t e ~ ( ) 4 / 1 , 0 N . In the cobweb treatment 
in the experiment, the participants act as advisors to the producers in the market, so their 
individual price expectations 
e
t h p ,  determine aggregate supply. The demand function is taken  
 
32 





t h sp p S , , = .  
For the laboratory experiments we chose parameter values  s=1/6 and  b=21/20, 
l=1/b=20/21 and, for the intercept of the demand function,  a=123. The (unkown) price 
adjustment rule then becomes:
5 





t t p p e + - =                   (A4)












t p p  is the average prediction of the six participants in the experimental 
market.   
 
Positive feedback: an asset pricing framework.  
The second market in our laboratory experiment consists of a standard asset-pricing model 
(see Cuthberson (1996), Campbell et al. (1997), and Brock and Hommes (1998)). Demand of 
speculators for a risky asset depends positively upon the asset’s expected price increase. 
Investors can either invest in a risk-free asset (e.g. a government bond) with a fixed gross 
return  1+r, or invest in a risky asset (e.g. a stock) paying an uncertain dividend  t y  in each 
period. In this model, excess demand for the risky asset leads to an increase in the asset price, 
and excess supply to a decrease (see Beja and Goldman (1980)). Since in the experiment 
demand was taken to be an increasing function of the price predictions, as would be natural in 
the case of a stock or some other financial asset, our asset pricing treatment was driven by 
positive expectations feedback, which, to a certain extent, confirmed any tendency in the 
                                                   
5 For this choice of the parameters, the lagged price 1 - t p drops from the price adjust-ment rule (A3), and (A4) is 
equivalent to the classical cobweb model with the market price  t p determined by market clearing.   
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participants' beliefs about future prices. As in the cobweb model above, a market maker 
adapts prices in proportion to excess demand and the actual development of prices is given by 









s t t t t h
t t z
a
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p p e
s











-                (A5) 
Excess demand is given by aggregate demand, which consists of the sum of individual 
demand functions of the traders in the market, minus the supply 
s z of shares of the risky asset, 
assumed to be constant. The expression for the demand function is standard in finance and 
obtained from mean-variance maximization of next period’s expected wealth, where a equals 
the coefficient of risk aversion,  ( ) ( ) ,1 1 htttt Epyrp - +-+  is the belief of trader h about excess 
return, and 
2 s  is the belief about the conditional variance of excess returns, here assumed to 
be constant for all periods and all traders. Each participant in the experiment acts as an advisor 
to a trader (say a large pension fund) informing them of their price prediction ,, ()
e
hthtt pEp = , 
which the trader then uses to calculate her demand function. Six participants form a market in 
the experiment, i.e. 6 = H .  
To achieve symmetry between the positive and negative feedback treatment, we 
choose parameters such that the treatments only differ in the sign of the expectations feed-
back. Fixing parameters  20 / 1 = r ,  6
2 = s a ,  1 =
s z ,  21 / 20 = l  and assuming  ( ) 4 , = t t h y E  






tt t ppe =++                     (A6)  
where, as before, 
e
t p  defines average price expectations over all subjects, and  t e ~ ( ) 4 / 1 , 0 N  is 
a random term, representing e.g. small random fluctuations in the supply of the risky asset. 
                                                   
6 As i n the cobweb treatment, for this choice of the parameters, the lagged price 1 - t p drops from the price 
adjustment rule (A5), so that for both treatments the  t p  is determined by average market expectations.   
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 
During each of the four experimental sessions, a short welcoming message was read aloud 
from paper, after which the participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle in the computer 
lab. In each cubicle there was a computer, some experimental instructions on paper and some 
blank paper with a pen. The two treatments had similar instructions that differed only in their 
description of the market environment. When all the participants were seated, they were asked 
to read the instructions on their desks. After a few minutes, they were given the opportunity to 
ask questions regarding the instructions, after which the experiment started. When the 50 time 
periods were completed, the participants were asked to remain seated and fill in the 
questionnaire, which was subsequently handed out to them. After a reasonable amount of 
time, the participants were called to the ante-room one by one to hand in the questionnaire and 
receive their earnings, in cash. The participants left the computer lab after receiving their 
earnings. 
The experimental instructions the participants read in their cubicles consisted of three 
parts, totalling five pages. The first part contained general information about the market the 
experiment was about to simulate, which was of course treatment-specific. The second part 
contained an explanation of the computer program used during the experiment. The third part 
displayed a table relating the absolute prediction error made in any single period to the 
amount of credits earned in that period. The conversion rate between credits and euros, being 
2600 credits to 1 euro, was made public by announcement, since it was not listed with the 
table. The questionnaire after the experiment contained 19 questions, the first 10 of which 
could be answered only by the integers 1 through 5. The experimental instructions will be 
translated below.  
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Translation of experimental instructions for negative feedback treatment 
 
Experimental instructions 
The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will 
be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the 
backside of this sheet of paper. 
General information 
You are an advisor of an importer who is active on a market for a certain product. In each 
time period the importer needs a good prediction of the price of the product. Furthermore, the 
price should be predicted one period ahead, since importing the good takes some time. As the 
advisor of the importer you will predict the price P(t) of the product during 50 successive time 
periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. 
The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings. 
About the market 
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. The size of 
demand is dependent on the price. If the price goes up, demand will go down. The supply on 
the market is determined by the importers of the product. Higher price predictions make an 
importer import a higher quantity, increasing supply. There are several large importers active 
on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment. Total supply is 
largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies of these importers. Besides the large 
importers, a number of small importers is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in 
total supply. 
About the price  
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will 




About predicting the price 
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in each time 
period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative 
and always lies between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in 
period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period 
ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1, 
V(1). When all participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market 
price P(1) for this period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) - 
V(1), your earnings in the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter 
your prediction for period 2, V(2). When all participants have submitted their prediction for 
the second period, the market price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your 
earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have 
to form a prediction at period t consists of: All market prices up to time period t -1: {P(t-1), 
P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., V(1)}; Your 
total earnings at time period t-1. 
About the earnings 
Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the 
price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible 
earnings. 
When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the com-





Translation of experimental instructions for positive feedback treatment 
Experimental instructions 
The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will 
be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the 
backside of this sheet of paper. 
General information 
You are an advisor of a trader who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time 
period the trader needs to decide how many units of the product he will buy, intending to sell 
them again the next period. To take an optimal decision, the trader requires a good prediction 
of the market price in the next time period. As the advisor of the trader you will predict the 
price P(t) of the product during 50 successive time periods. Your earnings during the 
experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller your prediction 
errors, the greater your earnings. 
About the market 
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. Supply and 
demand on the market are determined by the traders of the product. Higher price predictions 
make a trader d emand a higher quantity. A high price prediction makes the trader willing to 
buy the product, a low price prediction makes him willing to sell it. There are several large 
traders active on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment. 
Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies and demands of these 
traders. Besides the large traders, a number of small traders is active on the market, creating 
small fluctuations in total supply and demand. 
About the price 
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will 
rise. Conversely, if total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall.  
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About predicting the price 
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in each time 
period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative 
and lies always between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in 
period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period 
ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1, 
V(1). When all participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market 
price P(1) for this period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) - 
V(1), your earnings in the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter 
your prediction for period 2, V(2). When all participan ts have submitted their prediction for 
the second period, the market price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your 
earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have 
to form a prediction at period t consists of: All market prices up to time period t -1: {P(t-1), 
P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., V(1)}; Your 
total earnings at time period t-1. 
About the earnings 
Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the 
price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible 
earnings. 
When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the com-





Translation of computer instructions 
Computer instructions 
The way the computer program works that will be used in the experiment, is explained in the 
text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of 
paper. 
The mouse does not work in this program. 
Your earnings in the experiment depend on the accuracy of your predictions. A smaller 
prediction error in each period will result in higher earnings. 
To enter  your prediction you can use the numbers, the decimal point and, if necessary, the 
backspace key on the keyboard.  
Your prediction can have two decimal numbers, for example 30.75. Pay attention not to enter 
a comma instead of a point. Never use the comma. Press enter if you have made your choice. 
The better your prediction, the more credits you will earn. On your desk is a table listing your 
earnings for all possible prediction errors. 
For example, your prediction was 13.42. The true market price turned out to be 12.13. This 
means that the prediction error is: 13.42 – 12.13 ˜ 1.30. The table then says your earnings are 
1255 credits (as listed in the third column [this is a typing error, it should be second column]).  
The available information for predicting the price of the product in period t consists of: All 
product prices from the past up to period t-1; Your predictions up to period t-1; Your earnings 
until then. 
 
[Figure of computerscreen]  
The computer screen. 
The instructions below refer to this figure. 
In the upper left corner a graph will be displayed consisting of your predictions and of the true  
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prices in each period. This graph will be updated at the end of each period.  
In the rectangle in the middle left you will see information about the number of credits you 
have earned in the last period and the number you have earned in total. The time period is also 
displayed here, possibly along with other relevant information. 
On the right hand side of the screen the experimental results will be displayed, that is, your 
predictions and the true prices for at most the last 20 periods. 
At the moment of submitting your price prediction, the rectangle in the lower left side of the 
figure will appear. When all participants have subsequently submitted their predictions, the 
results for the next period will be calculated. 
When everyone is ready reading the instructions, we will begin the experiment. If you have 









Appendix C: Estimation Results of Individual Forecasting Rules.  




2  AC  Eq.  MSE 
                       
1  53.67  0.1080  0  0  0  0  0  0.2013  No  60.17  0.425 
2  29.75  0.7002  0  0  0  -0.1957  0  0.8795  No  60.04  0.668 
3  25.47  0  0.2431  0  0  0  0  0.0983  No  33.65  0.613 
4  23.30*  0.4213  0  0  0  0  0  0.1385  No  43.72  0.667 
5  32.90*  0.3919  -0.3136  0  0.3750  0  0  0.3077  No  60.18  0.925 
6  39.48  0.3255  0.2009  0  -0.5089  0  0.3240  0.6504  No  59.95  0.593 
7  87.60  0  0  0  0  -0.1772  -0.2876  0.3478  No  59.80  1.266 
8  10.26*  0.0111  0  0  0.0306  0  0  0.1912  No  10.71  1.363 
9  32.15  0.0953  0  0  0  0  0.3662  0.7756  Yes  —  0.709 
10  29.38  0.2818  0.2317  0  0  0  0  0.2821  No  60.39  0.792 
11  16.13  0.2697  0.1532  0  0  0.3088  0  0.4381  No  60.12  0.053 
12  20.81  0.6534  0  0  0  0  0  0.5102  No  60.04  1.157 
13  -0.489*  0.3003  0.4690  0  0  0.2218  0  0.7600  No  54.94  0.814 
14  59.15  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  59.15  1.126 
15  7.433  0.8692  0  0  0  0  0  0.9412  No  56.83  1.100 
16  31.26  0  0.4799  0  0  0  0  0.4220  No  60.10  1.232 
17  -170.6  0  0  0  -1.356  1.538  3.671  0.9670  No  59.80  1.105 
18  82.00  -0.7656  0.3995  0  0  0  0  0.7943  No  60.02  0.660 
19  34.40  0.4264  0  0  0  0  0  0.5653  No  59.97  0.511 
20  45.60  0.2423  0  0  0  0  0  0.3077  No  60.18  0.429 
21  60.00  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  60.00  0.292 
22  20.97  0.6489  0  0  0  0  0  0.7385  Yes  —  0.519 
23  16.56  0.3326  0.3946  0  0  0  0  0.2316  No  60.70  0.543 
24  60.00  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  60.00  0.292 
25  44.31  0.2653  0  0  0  0  0  0.2074  No  60.31  2.867 
26  23.03  -0.2041  0.4658  0  0.3586  0  0  0.6671  No  60.65  1.950 
27  60.98  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  60.98  3.960 
28  58.89  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  58.89  2.926 
29  45.38  0  0  -0.0898  0  0  0  0.5408  No  59.85  0.805 
30  5.533*  0.9115  0  0  0  0  0  0.7367  No  52.52  6.158 
31  5.767*  0.5157  0  0  0  0.3906  0  0.7284  No  61.55  0.687 
32  27.21  0.4251  0.1179  0  0  0  0  0.6324  No  59.54  0.588 
33  90.46  0  0  0  0  0  -0.5047  0.2533  No  60.12  0.482 
34  59.66  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  59.66  0.469 
35  45.71  0.2338  0  0  0  0  0  0.2004  No  59.66  0.656 
36  60.48  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  60.48  0.910 
 
 
Table 1:  Estimation Individual Forecasting Rules (negative feedback). 
Prediction rules for the 36 participants of the negative feedback treatment (least squares 
estimation of equation (7)). The first column shows participants' numbers, clustered according 
to group; the second through eighth column show estimates of the coefficients; the ninth and 
tenth columns show the R-squared statistic and report on autocorrelation in the residuals up to 
the 20th order (Ljung-Box Q-statistics, 5% level); the last two columns contain the long run 
equilibrium price and the mean squared error of the estimated rule. Insignificant variables 
were eliminated one by one, largest p value first, until all p values were below 5%. An 








2  AC  Eq.  MSE  
                       
1  -0.790*  1.675  0  -0.4329  -0.2324  0  0  0.9965  No  81.44  0.622 
2  -0.682*  1.340  -0.5007  0  0.4642  -0.2914  0  0.9980  No  56.36  0.708 
3  -1.176*  1.724  0  -0.3995  -0.3069  0  0  0.9932  No  66.82  0.738 
4  -1.121  1.893  -0.8748  0  0  0  0  0.9971  No  61.59  0.518 
5  0.417*  1.443  -0.8745  0  0.4264  0  0  0.9975  No  81.76  0.529 
6  -0.817*  1.787  -0.7724  0  0  0  0  0.9982  No  55.96  0.538 
7  0.742*  1.184  0  -0.1698  0  0  0  0.9964  Yes  —  0.550 
8  -0.179*  1.463  -0.4552  0  0  0  0  0.9938  No  22.95  0.536 
9  0.657*  1.220  -0.7315  0  0.5006  0  0  0.9969  No  60.28  0.477 
10  0.339*  1.285  0  0  0  -0.2887  0  0.9969  No  91.62  0.381 
11  0.693*  1.368  -0.8523  0  0.4743  0  0  0.9948  No  69.30  0.472 
12  0.223*  1.851  0  0  -0.3270  -0.3533  -0.1723  0.9926  No  139.4  0.521 
13  0.040*  1.450  -0.4504  0  0  0  0  0.9870  No  100.0  0.545 
14  0.164*  1.069  -0.4708  0  0.4000  0  0  0.9943  No  91.11  0.460 
15  -0.251*  1.275  -0.2989  -0.2706  0  0.2984  0  0.9981  No  64.36  0.649 
16  2.170*  1.232  0  0  0  -0.2662  0  0.9780  No  63.45  1.136 
17  -0.985*  1.251  0  -0.2345  0  0  0  0.9900  No  59.70  0.452 
18  -0.1026  1.219  -0.5430  0  0.4372  0  0  0.9942  No  -0.07  0.417 
19  2.411  1.084  0  0  0.2635  0  -0.3910  0.9940  No  55.43  0.880 
20  1.956*  -0.9115  0  0  0  0  0  0.8975  No  1.02  0.875 
21  1.382  1.641  -0.9729  0  0.3084  0  0  0.9978  No  58.81  0.515 
22  2.687  1.6274  -0.4900  0  0  0  -0.1816  0.9934  No  60.79  0.683 
23  1.475  1.441  0  -0.4659  0  0  0  0.9948  No  59.24  0.858 
24  0.062*  1.943  -0.9439  0  0  0  0  0.9953  No  68.89  0.977 
25  34.27  0  0.1203  0  0.3421  0.2670  -0.3179  0.9892  Yes  —  1.578 
26  173.7*  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0000  No  173.7  0.780 
27  2.601  1.000  0  -0.1972  -0.0384  0.1215  0.0682  1.0000  Yes  —  1.000 
28  4.160  1.005  0  0  0  -0.1025  0  0.9981  No  42.67  0.705 
29  15.71  1.004  0  0.5544  -0.2446  -0.4973  -0.1217  0.9981  Yes  —  1.385 
30  13.52  1.062  -0.5319  0.3410  0.2280  -0.0978  -0.2084  0.9995  No  65.28  0.860 
31  2.295*  0.8857  0  -0.4284  0.5064  0  0  0.9866  No  63.22  1.336 
32  0.7813*  1.117  -0.7796  0  0.6513  0  0  0.9927  No  69.14  0.823 
33  -0.946*  1.767  -0.8572  0.1052  0  0  0  0.9937  No  63.07  1.665 
34  8.501*  1.130  0  -0.4372  0  0  0  0.6584  No  27.67  0.905 
35  1.851  1.182  0  -0.5068  0  0.2952  0  0.9931  Yes  —  1.385 
36  14.01*  0.7478  0  0  0  0  0  0.2058  No  55.55  0.751 
37  -3.020*  1.0498  0  0  0  0  0  0.9363  No  60.64  0.391 
38  1.560  0.9728  0  0  0  0  0  0.9316  No  57.35  0.391 
39  6.501  1.1315  -0.2359  0  0  0  0  0.9656  No  62.27  0.342 
40  2.584*  1.043  0  0  0  -0.1619  0.0780  0.9719  No  63.18  0.298 
41  1.739*  1.383  -0.4099  0  0  0  0  0.9443  No  64.65  0.360 
42  1.113*  0.9327  -0.2968  0  0.3471  0  0  0.9569  No  65.47  0.445 
 
 
Table 2: Estimation Individual Forecasting Rules (positive feedback). 
Prediction rules for the 42 participants of the positive feedback treatment (least squares 















             
1  0.7389  0  0  2  N1  Naive Fundamentalist 
2  0  0  0  3  N1  None 
3  0.9362  0  0  4  N1  Naive & Fundamentalist 
4  0.1350  0.1923  0.0605  5  N1  Fundamentalist 
5  0.5689  0.3480  0  8  N2  None 
6  0.5553  0  0  12  N2  Naive Fundamentalist 
7  0.7391  0  -0.4444  13  N3  None 
8  0  0  0  14  N3  Naive & Fundamentalist 
9  -0.3770  0  -0.3762  18  N3  Naive Fundamentalist 
10  0.4016  0  0  19  N4  Naive Fundamentalist 
11  0  0  0  21  N4  Fundamentalist 
12  0  0  0  24  N4  Fundamentalist 
13  0.2633  0  0  25  N5  Fundamentalist 
14  0  0  0  27  N5  Naive & Fundamentalist 
15  0  0  0  28  N5  Naive & Fundamentalist 
16  0.9101  0  0  30  N5  Naïve 
17  0  0  0  34  N6  Fundamentalist 
18  0.4321  0  0  35  N6  None 
19  0  0  0  36  N6  None 
20  1.5096  -0.5238  0  3  P1  Naive Trend Follower 
21  1.0177  0  0.8591  4  P1   Naive Trend Follower 
22  0.5227  0.4711  0.9118  5  P1  Adaptive Trend Follower 
23  1.0142  0  0.7818  6  P1   None 
24  0.4888  0.5000  0.7290  9  P2  Adaptive Trend Follower 
25  0.4670  0.5269  0.9210  11  P2  Adaptive Trend Follower 
26  0.9994  0  0.4609  13  P3  Naive Trend Follower 
27  0.5369  0.4627  0.5587  14  P3  Adaptive Trend Follower 
28  1.0090  0  0.2765  15  P3  Naive Trend Follower 
29  0.9557  0  0  20  P4  Naive Trend Follower 
30  0.6669  0.3089  0.9696  21  P4  None 
31  0.9616  0  0.8678  22  P4  None 
32  0.9989  0  0.9437  24  P4  Naive & Adaptive Tr.Foll. 
33  0  0  0  26  P5  Naive & Adaptive Tr.Foll. 
34  0.2831  0.7045  0.8266  32  P6  Adaptive Trend Follower 
35  1.1366  -0.1226  0.6077  33  P6  Naive Trend Follower 
36  0.7428  0  0  36  P6  Naive Trend Follower 
37  1.0376  0  0  37  P7  None 
38  0.9419  0  0  38  P7  None 
39  1.0155  0  0.2907  41  P7  Naive Trend Follower 
40  0.6370  0.3842  0.3182  42  P7  Adaptive Trend Follower 
 
 
Table 3: Estimation of Individual First Order Heuristics. 
Prediction rules for both treatments (least squares estimation of equation (9)) for the Prism of 
First-Order Heuristics. The first column is the number of relevant participants, clustered 
according to treatment; the second, third and fourth columns show estimates of the  
coefficients, estimated by eliminating the least significant variable until all p values were 
below 5%. This procedure was applied only to the linear prediction rules statistically 
equivalent to a rule in the Prism (Wald restriction test, 5% level). The fifth and sixth columns 
show the participant's original number and group (cf. Tables 1 and 2); the seventh checks for 
statistical equivalence with canonical rules (Wald restriction test, 5%). 
 